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Medical futility is a highly controversial topic that tests the limits on
personal autonomy at the end of one's life. One suggested definition of med-
ical futility is "[an] intervention that [is] unlikely to produce any significant
benefit for the patient."' A more authoritative and detailed characterization
of medical futility is the conflict that arises "[wihen the medical professional
and the patient, through a surrogate, disagree on the worth of pursuing life."2
Most often, the former considers medical intervention to be futile while the
latter desires to delay the inevitable.
This issue is rarely litigated in courts for several reasons-the most ob-
vious being the eventual death of the patient. In the case of Bernstein v.
Superior Court, a state appellate court dealt with the issue of medical futility
during a family dispute regarding the level of proper care that should be
afforded to the patient.3 The court found that the family member pursuing
life-prolonging measures was not basing his decisions on medical advice and
therefore failed to act in good faith or in the patient's best interest.4
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The 79-year-old conservatee patient, Karl Bernstein, had two sons, Ilya
and Nicholas, through his second marriage with Olga Bernstein and one son,
Scot Bernstein, by a prior marriage.5 After years of suffering through degen-
erative symptoms, Karl was officially diagnosed with Alzheimer's Disease in
April 1999.6 Over the next few years, Karl's condition only worsened. He
was transferred from one health care facility to another, only to return to one
of the first hospitals he had visited-Los Robles Hospital.7 At that point the
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1. Nancy S. Jecker, Ethics in Medicine, Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://
depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/futil.html.
2. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1074-75 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
3. See Bernstein v. Superior Court, 2009 WL 224942, at * I (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
4. Id. at *12.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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family members began to dispute the care Karl should receive and whether
there should be orders to resuscitate-or not to resuscitate, otherwise referred
to as "DNR."8
Scot officially became Karl's temporary conservator in April 2003, be-
cause Olga was unable to pay for the costs to oppose Scot while dealing with
the stresses of litigation and Karl's illness.9 Scot and Olga's agreement ex-
pressly stated "that Scot would adhere to physician recommendations."'o
Soon after, Karl became "completely bedridden, non-communicative, fully
contracted in a fetal position, incontinent, unable to eat or swallow, and ...
unable to undertake any volitional act."" He was in a persistent vegetative
state and was no longer able to consent to medical treatment, yet he under-
went several invasive procedures to keep him alive for the last six years of
his life.12
Karl suffered from a lack of any significant rest or sleep due to the
distortion of his legs underneath him, and his body could not "process the
nutrition provided through the feeding tube, rendering him extremely thin
and wasted."3 He also contracted recurring infections-like pneumonia-
because of the tracheostomy tube, and the physicians determined that the
intramuscular antibiotic injections were "too painful to continue given their
lack of therapeutic value."14
Ilya and Nicholas "contended that Scot had abused his authority as con-
servator by . . . demanding a series of painful and invasive treatments having
no medical or therapeutic value for Karl."5 They requested that the trial
court change the conservator from Scot to Olga because Scot was not acting
in the best interests of Karl, who wrote about his own death in his handwrit-
ten journal expressing his desire for "'some pleasure and comfort out of life,
as well as to add to the pleasure and comfort of others."'16
Karl's doctors unanimously concluded "that Karl [was] in a persistent
vegetative state . . . [and] most if not all of the medical staff believed that
Karl experience[d] some amount of pain."17 Furthermore, the court-ordered
report showed "that the doctors ha[d] determined a number of procedures and
treatments [were] futile [and] essentially all of the treatments Karl [was] re-
8. Id.






15. Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at *2.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Id. at *4.
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ceiving [were] inappropriate and the family should withdraw support alto-
gether [because] there [was] minimal, if anything, that [could] be done to
change his condition."18
III. DESCRIPTION OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
Scot Bernstein petitioned that the trial court erred by ruling that Karl's
stated desires were not being met because his "present condition was uncom-
fortable and painful, not pleasurable for him, and his suffering causeld] stress
for all his family [while] the Bioethics Committee concluded there was no
treatment that had therapeutic value for Karl's condition." 9 Respondents
primarily focused on a request to "prohibit medical treatments that are pain-
ful and medically futile, such as intramuscular antibiotic injections, discon-
tinue feeding methods that are painful and futile, and remove the
tracheostomy tube."20
Scot Bernstein argued that "the trial court confused the issue of remov-
ing him [as conservator with] the issue of whether Karl's life should be ter-
minated."21 He contended that "the only 'harm' articulated by the trial court
was Scot's actions in keeping Karl alive [yet there was] no evidence that his
behavior negatively impacted Karl's care."22 Furthermore, Scot argued that
because of his diligence, Karl actually received "excellent care" when Scot
made the decision as the conservator to ignore the medical advice of the
treating physicians.23
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
The trial court denied Scot's request and ruled in favor of the respon-
dents, and the court also appointed Ilya as the conservator, while denying
Scot's request for further hearing on the issue.24 Moreover, the trial court
"rejected the 'clear and convincing standard,' stating that the 'preponderance
test' applied in this case."25 In response to the trial court's ruling, Scot ap-
pealed, contending that "the trial court abused its discretion in removing him
as conservator."26
18. Id.
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id.
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V. COURT HOLDING AND OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE
California's Second District Court of Appeal found that the trial court
"applied the proper burden of proof and properly found that Scot was not
acting in good faith or in Karl's best interests because Scot's judgment and
objectivity were impaired."27 The appellate court's basic rationale was based
on the fact that Scot had acted contrary to the medical advice of the treating
doctors, who unanimously agreed that "Karl ha[d] been in a persistent or
chronic vegetative state for several years with no hope of recovery, the pain-
ful and futile medical procedures should be terminated, he should be placed
on DNR, and he should be moved to a sub-acute care facility."28
VI. COURT'S RATIONALE
The California appellate court refused to apply the clear-and-convincing
standard used in Conservatorship of Wendland "in determining whether or
not to allow removal of nutrition, hydration, and respiratory care" because
Karl was not "conscious" and the evidence was undisputed that Karl was in a
persistent vegetative state with no hope of recovery. 29 Although Karl did
show some type of "awareness," any semblance of responsiveness was only
"in response to certain medical treatments [and such a] showing of discom-
fort [did] not render Karl 'conscious' within the meaning of Wendland."30
Moreover, the court rejected the theory that "a person could be both in a
persistent vegetative state and conscious at the same time [because] the terms
are mutually exclusive."31
The court denied Scot any request for a further hearing based on Probate
Code § 2355, explaining that it "does not require a further hearing for the
court to give its approval of a conservator's decision to withdraw medical
treatment, or guarantee an interested party the right to have a hearing should
the interested party take issue with a decision as the conservator."32 The
court further elaborated on its stance: "Courts have held that judicial inter-
vention in 'right to die' cases should be minimal. Courts are not the proper
place to resolve the agonizing personal problems that underlie these cases."33
Thus, the California appellate court agreed that "[n]ot only is there no
useful purpose in having a further hearing on the subject of the removal of
life sustaining treatment [but] such a hearing would only compound the dam-
27. See Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at * 12.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001)).
30. Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at *13.
31. Id. at *13 n.2.
32. Id. at *13 (citing Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 196-97,
200, 202-03 (1998)).
33. Id. at *14 (citing Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 312
(1988)).
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age done to [Karl] and this family . . . by Scot."34 Moreover, the court ac-
knowledged that the Bernstein family simply "suffered enough."35
VII. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S APPROACH
California's Second District Court of Appeal was rather deferential to
the trial court's opinion-it simply borrowed the language from the lower
court to explain its holding.36 The facts of this case happened to be advanta-
geous for the respondents; they had the benefit of "undisputed and over-
whelming evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing" in their favor.37
The court even admitted that it wanted to remain deferential and relatively
quiet on this highly sensitive "right to die" issue.38
The court's level of silence on medical futility is disappointing at best.
The state appellate court did well to cite to past cases within its own jurisdic-
tion to determine perspectives and definitions regarding the topic.39 But the
court missed a golden opportunity to enhance the dialogue regarding medical
futility. This court could have had a greater impact on the rarely litigated
subject of medical futility. Not only would courts within the state of Califor-
nia benefit, but several courts across the nation could have looked to this
decision for guidance due to the lack of case law on the issue. Regrettably,
the California appellate court chose the minimalist route in articulating its
opinion.40
The court failed to refer to cases like Causey v. St. Francis Medical
Center, even though a simple footnote could have shined more light on the
topic of medical futility.41 California likely would have been well-served had
this court emulated the sensitive rendering of the futility problem provided
by the Causey court.42 In the Causey decision, the Louisiana court looked to
the "subjective value judgments" used to determine futility "in terms of per-
sonal values, not in terms of medical science."43 The Causey court seemed to
understand the very sensitive nature of such a "conflict over values, i.e.,
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at *13-14.
37. Id. at *15.
38. Id. at *14.
39. See id. at *12-14; supra note 28, 31-32.
40. See generally id. at * I4.
41. See generally Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App.
1998).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 1074.
2010]1 235
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
whether extra days obtained through medical intervention are worth the bur-
den and costs." 4 4
This is in stark contrast to the Bernstein court, which took the less con-
troversial route by choosing to look narrowly to the specific situation at hand,
where the facts paint a picture of an end-of-life patient in great pain and
without hope.45 The Causey court addressed a myriad of issues, such as a
"physician's obligation to obtain informed consent [which] is both an ethical
requirement and a legal standard of care derived from principles of individual
integrity and self-determination."46 In contrast, the Bernstein court merely
stated that "judicial intervention in 'right to die' cases should be mini-
mal"47-effectively shying away from addressing persuasive cases from
other jurisdictions, which might be of benefit to future medical futility cases
in the state and country.
The court could have also chosen to examine statutes from other states
dealing with medical futility, such as the Texas Advance Directives Act of
1999, "the first of its kind in the country."48 Also known colloquially as the
"Texas Futility Statute," this landmark act has been influential in the surro-
gate decision-making process when there is a dispute over end-of-life treat-
ment for an incapacitated patient.49
Litigation in these types of circumstances can only make the process
more difficult for the family-which is perhaps one reason there is little case
law on the issue-so statutes (such as the one in Texas) have clarified a
blurry issue, providing a specific number of days that a medically futile pa-
tient may receive life-sustaining treatment.50 During this allotted period of
ten days, there are several situations which can arise: the family's eventual
acquiescence to the doctors' opinions, the death of the patient, or a continued
impasse period. Although it is far from an ideal statute, it seems to be a step
in the right direction as it provides the proper procedure if not effectuating a
directive or treatment decision.51
As discussed above, the topic of informed consent providing a discus-
sion on the issue of individual autonomy is also lacking in the Bernstein
court's decision.52 Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health
44. Id.
45. See generally Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at *4.
46. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075.
47. Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942 at *14.
48. Robert L. Fine, Medical Futility and the Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999,
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, Apr. 13, 2000, available at http://
www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1312296.
49. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 2003).
50. Id. at § 166.046(e).
51. Id. at § 166.046(a).
52. See generally Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942.
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is a binding decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that this court could have
referred to for a discussion on individual autonomy.53 Although the facts in
Cruzan are different from those in Bernstein, Cruzan is beneficial in terms of
examining the constitutional rights associated with permitting a state to cre-
ate a high evidentiary barrier for an incompetent patient's right to die.54
In Cruzan, the patient suffered a massive brain injury from an automo-
bile accident, which eventually led to her entering into a persistent vegetative
state. 55 The evidence showed that "Cruzan's expression to a former house-
mate that she would not wish to continue her life if sick or injured unless she
could live at least halfway normally suggested that she would not wish to
continue on with her nutrition and hydration."56 However, the Missouri Su-
preme Court disagreed with the idea that her surrogate decision-makers were
ultimately permitted to determine her end-of-life choices, "concluding that
no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the
formalities required by the Living Will statute or clear and convincing evi-
dence of the patient's wishes."57
The debate hinged on the question of whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution allowed a state to create a high clear and con-
vincing evidence standard in determining an incompetent patient's right to
die.58 The petitioners in Cruzan "insist[ed] that under the general holdings of
[the Court's] cases, the forced administration of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, and even of artificially delivered food and water essential to life,
would implicate a competent person's liberty interest."59 They also argued
that "an incompetent person should possess the same right [of refusing life-
saving hydration and nutrition] as is possessed by a competent person."60
The majority of the justices assumed that the right to die is a protected
liberty interest of a competent patient.61 Although even the nation's Supreme
Court has proven to be somewhat elusive in these controversial "right to die"
cases, this does not excuse this California court from addressing medical fu-
tility to the fullest-because a healthy discussion in an opinion would be
more beneficial to all.
53. See generally Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990) [hereinafter "Cruzan"].
54. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87.
55. Id. at 261.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 263.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
It is fair to say that the topic of medical futility is quite nebulous. As
medical technology continues to advance, the question of whether medical
intervention is ever medically futile will increasingly become a heated sub-
ject of debate. Texas remains as one of only a small number of states with
such a specific statute concerning medical futility. But even the Texas
Health & Safety Code section 166.046 is lacking in many regards, as it
leaves open many situations where a person with neither an irreversible nor
terminable condition can have the statute used against them.6 2 Society as a
whole can only benefit when there is greater dialogue on controversial topics
such as medical futility. Unfortunately, cases like Bernstein provide very
little guidance when much is needed. There seems to be little regard for
foresight in the opinions of such important state cases that rarely exist for
review. Simply put, the Bernstein court fell short when there was a great
opportunity to shine.
62. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 2003).
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